控制不了大房间温度，就另建一个小房间

Club提要：“我的一个想法是，如果大房间里面的遥控器‘抢’不到，我们或许可以建‘小房间’——这是我们金砖货币可能做的一个过渡措施”。

在北京对话和联合国南方中心South Center共同主办、中国公共外交协会指导的“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会上，清华大学国际关系学系主任、北京对话特约专家唐晓阳接过翟东升 （一屋子人用空调，为什么美国拿着遥控器？）和马可（“空调”是中国制造，“遥控器”却在美国人手里——这不公平）关于空调遥控器的比喻，提出金砖国家货币和金融体系改革方向。

唐晓阳指出，美元作为全球主导货币，对发展中国家造成剥削和经济打击，但短期内难以被替代。他建议，金砖国家可以建立小规模的替代性国际货币系统，以适应发展中国家的特定需求。金砖货币的建立，应锚定于发展中国家的特性和需求，如数字货币、资源或大宗商品，并以基础设施和工业设施投资为主。总之，金砖国家的货币系统可以从小规模试验开始，最终可能对全球经济产生重大影响。

8月下旬，北京对话将邀请国内外专家继续就“金砖国家与多极世界构建”展开对话。为了更好地承上启下，我们精选部分特约专家在五月份研讨会上的发言，以中英文形式陆续发布。

以下为唐晓阳发言：

我接着说说遥控器的比喻。我的一个想法是，如果我们大房间里面的遥控器“抢”不到，我们或许可以建小房间——这是我们金砖货币可能做的一个过渡措施。而且在当前美元高息的情况下，这恰恰是一个机会。这也是中国过去四十载改革开放的一个经验，即如何从小到大，如何进行双轨制。虽然这在很多主流经济学家看来会浪费资源、较难协调，但中国确实能够通过这样慢慢积累经验，把实践慢慢做大。当然，最终是否一定能成功，以及成功的时间，谁都不知道，这便是试验的意义。

我认为可以在此提出供大家参考，是否能建立这样的小规模系统？几位发言人都有提及，当前美元作为全球货币的地位不可撼动，这与其金融服务及历史遗留下来的作用效用密切相关。但从政治角度来看，美元存在不合理性，它越来越多地对其他发展中国家造成剥削和经济打击。因此，我们完全可以在这种情况下提倡形成更多共识，提出替代性的国际货币。

但替代性国际货币在短期内无法提供像美元般强大的全球影响力，例如其便利性及雄厚的资本。因此，我建议把这种替代型货币主要作为一种耐心资本的货币。我们现在也常讨论耐心资本，而耐心资本跟全球流通型的资本一个显著区别，就在于我们并不改变它——比如要增值，并不改变它的流通属性，而是可以放缓其流通过程，逐渐降低其增值的需求。

我们现在讲我们用时间来换取利润，比如它的利润来作为交换，这可能对于金砖国家，尤其对广大发展中国家、全球南方国家共同发展的需要来说，是一个更契合的支付工具和货币方式。

因为现在我们可以看到全球性的美元存在的问题，在于其依赖个别国家或10%的人口，然后又受短期的政策来上下波动，同时又有大量的金融投资造成的国际资本的游资。这些都使得这样一种全球性的货币，对发展中国家长期稳定发展造成巨大冲击。所以，我们如果把金砖国家作为试验的话，我们可能就要避免这样一种短期的利润追求。

我们希望金砖国家货币成为一种共同的国际货币，避免将其锚定在个别国家或者单一货币。我觉得现在全球南方难以找到这样的替代物——他们并不想把“遥控器”完全就交给另外一个人。但是，我们可以共同建立一个更小、但有更多共识的房间。这里边也涉及锚定物包括抵押物的问题。全球市场所需要的元素，我们还是都需要，因为这是多年发展下来大家的共识。但是我们在锚定物包括抵押物的选择上面，我们会更符合现在金砖国家或者全球南方国家所需要的方式，规模可以小一点。

例如，抵押物，无论是数字货币、资源或大宗商品，都符合发展中国家的特性和需要。我们都需要资源，而对于数字货币，应避免如比特币那些已经能够被游资炒作的资本，而是由金砖国家自己设定以及自己控制的数字货币，以此为锚定物，并且包括我们主要投资的基础设施及工业设施。但这也不完全是政治性的，而是要有较为严格的考量，比如其增值潜力。这当然也需要一定的抵押物，但在抵押物的讨论上面，比如金砖银行，作为一个贷款方来抵押，这样也能够避免像在国际上产生的那种债务陷阱，或者对个别国家指责，大家能够形成一个共同的担保抵押体系。

另外，在流通方面，我们仍可鼓励一定程度的债券流通。例如，即使有一些不良贷款或有一定风险，还是能够在必要程度上进行转移。但是这些转移可能不是在那些完全私营、为了最高的效率和利润率的这些国家及机构来进行，而是让金砖银行能够形成最后的担保体系，所以这可能需要在规模有限度的情况下做一个试验。特别是在当前美元利息高启的情况下，我们做一些小规模的试验很有价值。

随着这样的推动，例如金融软硬件设施的建设：结算系统，再投资的渠道和闭环系统，这些建设都可以在这“小房间”内让金砖国家也起到国际货币基金组织IMF在某种程度上所起到的作用。但相较于IMF，我们同时兼顾了国际私营市场和商业银行的范围。金砖国家相对来讲是从小开始，然后长期以耐心和可行性为根基。金砖国家虽然可能是一小步，但它可能会是整个世界的一大步，相当于美国登月。我们把它用到了金砖国家政治意义方面，这也需要更大的政治共识。所以在这方面对于金砖国家是个很好的契机，从实处着手，将远大理想与实际机会结合。

刚才提到的问题，即为什么我们现在不做金砖货币，我认为有很多的考虑。我觉得很重要的问题是，大家认为实施以后会有什么收益，然后会有什么损失？如果这个事情做了以后，大家都会有很大的收益，我觉得很多人会去做。但现在的问题是，尽管美元存在各种不公正之处，但它确实为我们提供了广阔的市场和许多便利。而我们如果实施金砖货币，由于它主要还是在一些发展中国家流通，因此其流通性、稳定性和收益性都有可能面临很大的风险。

所以这个也跟前面提到的美元相关，包括虽然美元存在空心化现象，但其现在的增值能力也是跟它的生产力密切相关，它在高科技行业还是有非常高的增长。虽然我们在制造业上已经有了很大进步，但在高科技领域的增长仍然是美元保持坚挺的一个重要原因，大家仍然愿意投资美国及其资本市场。因此，如果要建立金砖货币，如何保证其生产力的益处是一个关键问题。

美元忽视了发展中国家的需求，例如基础设施和基础工业的长期建设，以及提供工作机会的需要。正如布萨尼所言，美国对发展中国家的几亿劳动力不感兴趣，只追求最高的资本回报。如果金砖货币能够针对这些需求，提供相关利益，可能会有更多国家愿意接受这种货币，因为这对他们有更大的好处。

唐晓阳在“ 金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会发言 （图源：北京对话）

以下为英文全文：

I will further elaborate on the analogy of the remote control. My notion is that if we can’t find the remote control in a big room, we can possibly create a smaller room - and that is a potential interim measure taken by BRICS currency. Under the context of the current high interest rates of the US dollar, this might be a very opportunity. This is also one of the lessons learned from China’s reform and opening up over the past four decades, namely, how to develop a dual-track system from a small to a large Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Although this maybe seen by many mainstream economists as a waste of resources, and difficult to coordinate, China has indeed been able to slowly accumulate experience in this manner and gradually make the practice stronger. Indeed, no one knows whether it will definitely succeed and the corresponding time, yet this is what the experimentation entails. 

However, I believe it is worth proposing here for everyone's consideration – can we establish such a small-scale system? Several speakers have mentioned that the current status of the US dollars as the global currency is unshakable, closely tied to its financial services and historical constructions. However, from a political perspective, the US dollar has its own irrationalities, which increasingly cause exploitation and economic blows to other developing countries. Therefore, we can fully advocate for the formation of more consensus and propose an alternative international currency. 

However, an alternative international currency cannot provide the same formidable global influence as the US dollar in the short term, such as its convenience and substantial capital. Therefore, I suggest that this alternative currency should primarily serve as a form of patient capital. We often talk about patient capital, and a significant difference between patient capital and globally circulating capital is that we do not alter it—unlike the need to increase its value, we do not change its attribute of circulation, but instead, we can slow down its circulation process, gradually reducing the demand for it to add value.

Now we are talking about exchanging time for profit, where the profit itself serves as a medium of exchange, still attracting a great deal of collective thought. This could be a more fitting payment tool and currency method for the BRICS countries, especially for the vast developing countries and Global South countries, in terms of our shared development needs.

As we can see, the problem with the US dollar is that it is dependent on a few privileged countries or 10% of the population, and is equally subject to short-term policy fluctuations, whilst being subject to international capital flows caused by large financial investments. All these factors make such a global currency a huge impact on the long-term stable development of developing countries. Therefore, if we use the BRICS as a testbed, we may not want to avoid pursuing short-term profits.

We aspire to make the BRICS currency a common international currency and avoid anchoring to individual countries or single currencies. I think it's difficult to find such an alternative in the Global South at the moment - they don't want to hand over the remote control to someone else entirety. But we can together establish a smaller room, what's important is that we build it together. This also involves the issues of anchors and collateral. The elements that the world's global markets need, we still need them all, because that's a consensus that has developed over the years. But in terms of the choice of anchors and collateral, we will be more in line with the way that the BRICS or the Global South needs to be, and the scale could be slightly smaller.

Collateral, for example, whether it is digital currencies, resources or commodities, they fit the characteristics and needs of developing countries. We all need resources, and for digital currencies, we should avoid capital that is speculated on by lobbyists, such as Bitcoin, and instead be able to have digital currencies that are set by and controlled by the BRICS countries themselves, and use that as an anchor, then include the infrastructure and the industrial facilities that we have invested in primarily to begin with. But it's not entirely political, there are also more rigorous considerations, such as its value-added potential. This also requires a certain amount of collateral, but amid the collateral discussion, such as the BRICS Bank, as a lender to collateralise, we can also avoid the kind of debt traps that have arisen internationally, or the accusation of individual countries that we can all form a common security collateral system.

In addition, in terms of liquidity, we can still encourage a certain degree of bond liquidity. For example, even if there are loans that are non-performing or risky, they can still be transferred to the extent necessary. But this transfer may not be made to those countries and institutions that are fully private, for the highest efficiency and profitability, but rather to the BRICS Bank, which can form the final guarantee system, so this may be done on an experimental basis with a limited scale. Especially in the current situation of high interest rates on the US dollar, it would be valuable for us to experiment on a smaller scale.

With such facilitation, the construction of financial software and hardware facilities, such as settlement systems, channels for reinvestment, and closed-loop systems, can enable the BRICS countries to play a role within a limited scope that the IMF plays to a certain extent. But in contrast to the scope of the IMF, which has to take into account both international private markets and commercial banks, the BRICS countries are starting relatively small, and then rooting themselves in patience and viability over the long term. Although BRICS may bea small step, it may be a big step for the whole world, equivalent to the United States landing on the moon but we use it in the political significance of BRICS, which also requires greater political consensus. So in this regard, it is a good opportunity for BRICS to start from the ground up, combining ambitious ideals with practical opportunities.

Why don't we have a BRICS currency now? I think a very important issue is what everyone believes will be the gains and losses after implementation. If this is something that would bring significant benefits to everyone, I think many people would be willing to do it. But the problem now is that, despite the various injustices of the US dollar, it does provide us with a vast market and many conveniences. And if we implement the BRICS currency, since it is still mainly circulating in some developing countries, its liquidity, stability and profitability may face great risks.

This is also related to the US dollar as mentioned earlier, including the fact that despite there is a hollowing out of the dollar, its value-added capacity is now also that it's closely related to its productivity, and it's still having very high growth in the high-tech sector.

Whilst we have made great progress in manufacturing, growth in the high-tech sector remains a key reason why the US dollar has remained strong, and there is still a willingness to invest in the United States and its capital markets. Therefore, if a BRICS currency is to be established, the question of how to ensure its productivity benefits is a key question.

The challenge to the US dollar's position may lie in its dominance in high-tech, but it ignores the needs of developing countries, such as the long-term building of infrastructure and basic industries, and the need to provide jobs. As Busani notes, the US is not interested in the hundreds of millions of labourers in the developing world and is only after the highest return on capital. If the BRICS currency could target these needs and provide the associated benefits, more countries might be willing to accept the currency as it would be of greater benefit to them. These are my further comments.

（翻译：毛琪）